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Cognitive Abilities, Monitoring
Confidence, and Control Thresholds
Explain Individual Differences in
Heuristics and Biases
Simon A. Jackson*, Sabina Kleitman, Pauline Howie and Lazar Stankov
School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
In this paper, we investigate whether individual differences in performance on heuristic
and biases tasks can be explained by cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and
control thresholds. Current theories explain individual differences in these tasks by the
ability to detect errors and override automatic but biased judgments, and deliberative
cognitive abilities that help to construct the correct response. Here we retain cognitive
abilities but disentangle error detection, proposing that lower monitoring confidence and
higher control thresholds promote error checking. Participants (N = 250) completed
tasks assessing their fluid reasoning abilities, stable monitoring confidence levels, and
the control threshold they impose on their decisions. They also completed seven typical
heuristic and biases tasks such as the cognitive reflection test and Resistance to
Framing. Using structural equation modeling, we found that individuals with higher
reasoning abilities, lower monitoring confidence, and higher control threshold performed
significantly and, at times, substantially better on the heuristic and biases tasks.
Individuals with higher control thresholds also showed lower preferences for risky
alternatives in a gambling task. Furthermore, residual correlations among the heuristic
and biases tasks were reduced to null, indicating that cognitive abilities, monitoring
confidence, and control thresholds accounted for their shared variance. Implications
include the proposal that the capacity to detect errors does not differ between
individuals. Rather, individuals might adopt varied strategies that promote error checking
to different degrees, regardless of whether they have made a mistake or not. The results
support growing evidence that decision-making involves cognitive abilities that construct
actions and monitoring and control processes that manage their initiation.
Keywords: decision-making, cognitive abilities, confidence, control, heuristics, biases, metacognition
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making often depends on the use of mental shortcuts (heuristics), which avoid the need
for overwhelming mental computation but can also bias our judgments under certain conditions
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Yet there
are pervasive individual differences in the degree to which people exhibit these sorts of biases
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(Appelt et al., 2011). This presents an opportunity in areas
such as the assessment of decision-making, which relies on
the presence of reliable individual differences. However, it also
presents complexities. For example, this means that a one-size-
fits-all approach will fail when it comes to predicting conditions
that elicit heuristics, designing effective decision aids, and so on.
Therefore, to support solutions for these opportunities and issues,
this paper will aim to investigate whether individual differences in
heuristics and biases (H&B) can be explained by three decision-
relevant constructs: cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence,
and control thresholds.
Heuristics and Biases
To provide some context, we will first examine a well-known task
designed to elicit the use of a heuristic that leads to a biased
judgment: the bat and ball problem from Frederick’s (2005)
Cognitive Reflection Test:
Together a bat and a ball cost $1.10.
The bat costs $1 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
Most people respond that the answer is 10 cents (Frederick,
2005). Some mental shortcut (heuristic) is thought to construct
this response quickly and seemingly effortlessly, without the need
for mental calculations. A simple verification will show that
the answer is five cents, however. Thus, items in the Cognitive
Reflection Test elicit heuristically constructed but incorrect
responses that must be checked and corrected. Indeed, many of
the tasks used to establish that, and further investigate how we
use heuristics when making decisions are similar to this. That is,
most H&B tasks present a question that allows for a normatively
correct response, but which people often avoid.
Individual Differences
Not long after their emergence, it became apparent that
individuals varied in their susceptibility to committing errors
and biases elicited by H&B tasks (e.g., Stanovich and West,
1998a,b,c). For example, while many people respond “10 cents”
to the problem above, some respond correctly. Individuals’
performance on a range of H&B tasks has now been found to
correlate in a weak to moderate fashion (e.g., Stanovich and West,
2000; Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007;
West et al., 2008; Stanovich et al., 2012; Teovanovic´ et al., 2015).
An ongoing challenge being addressed by this literature has been
to explain the nature and source of this covariance.
There have been two prominent approaches for explaining
these individual differences in H&B tasks. Researchers originally
hypothesized that a single rationality-like construct might be the
source. The first approach was to therefore model covariance
among H&B tasks via factor analysis to extract common sources
underlying performance. Factor analyses of H&B tasks tend
to yield solutions with two or more factors that are difficult
to interpret within and between studies, however (Parker and
Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Weaver and Stewart,
2012; Teovanovic´ et al., 2015). Furthermore, these sorts of
psychometric studies demonstrate that H&B tasks tend to have
relatively low reliability estimates. It is clear from this work that
H&B tasks are not collectively and consistently tapping a single,
general, and desirable construct.
The second approach has involved seeking correlates/
predictors of individual’s H&B task performance on the basis
of dual-process theories. According to these theories, two broad
categories of cognitive processes construct judgments and actions
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013 for a review). Type 1 processes are
automatic and tend to rely on knowledge structures acquired via
learning. They include processes like associative and constructive
intuition (Glöckner and Witteman, 2010; Evans and Stanovich,
2013). Type 1 processes are therefore the typical source of
heuristic responses that lead to errors on H&B tasks. Type
2 processes are deliberative and effortful mental operations.
A classic example is fluid reasoning ability (Gf; Carroll, 1993;
Stankov, 2000; McGrew, 2005, 2009). Gf is defined as “deliberate
and controlled mental operations to solve novel problems that
cannot be performed automatically” (McGrew, 2009, p. 5). Their
reliance on working memory and controlled attention impose
limits of their processing capacity (Evans and Stanovich, 2013;
Shipstead et al., 2014). Such Type 2 abilities are the source of
accurate responses on many H&B tasks. Investigated predictors
of H&B tasks, therefore, tend to relate to Type 2 abilities or
constructs that help shift decision makers from erroneous Type
1 to more accurate Type 2 thinking.
Stanovich and West (2008) proposed that Type 1 heuristic
errors on tasks like the Cognitive Reflection Test must be detected
so that Type 2 processes like Gf can become engaged. By this
account, individuals with stronger Type 2 cognitive abilities and
who are better able to detect errors of judgment will perform
better on H&B tasks. Researchers have therefore tested models
such as that shown in Figure 1A.
Adopting this approach, researchers measure individuals’
performance on a H&B task and predict the scores with cognitive
abilities (e.g., Gf) and variables related to error detection (e.g.,
West et al., 2008; Toplak et al., 2011; Del Missier et al., 2012;
Thompson and Johnson, 2014). In these studies, individuals’
ability to detect errors tends to be measured via executive control
tasks in which they must suppress proponent and inaccurate
responses in response time tasks. Alternatively, individuals are
asked to self-report their tendency to engage in or enjoy Type
2 cognitive processing via self-report measures. Such studies
typically find that Gf and error detection-like constructs are
significant positive predictors of performance on H&B tasks in
the manner proposed above.
Given these findings, we will assess here two ways to obtain
greater information about individual differences in H&B tasks
like the Cognitive Reflection Test. The first will be to model
changes in covariance among H&B tasks. Rather than factor
analyzing all tasks together or regressing each task independently
on predictors, we will adopt a new approach. Specifically, we
will regress individuals’ H&B task scores on a set of predictors
in a single Structural Equation Model, and allow their residuals
to correlate freely. If the predictors are generally underlying
performance on the H&B tasks, then we should observe more
than just the significant regression coefficients that are found
when each H&B task is used in separate regression models.
More specifically, the residual covariance among the H&B tasks
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FIGURE 1 | Models used for predicting individual differences in heuristic and biases (H&B) tasks. (A) Represents existing approaches; (B) represents the
approach adopted in this research.
in a single SEM (i.e., the correlated error terms after being
regressed on the predictors) should be considerably lower than
their zero-order correlations, and possibly null. If the predictors
are accounting for task-specific variance only, then we should
observe significant regression coefficients, but little change from
the zero-order to the residual correlations among the H&B tasks.
Our second addition will be to disentangle the notion of error
detection into distinct aspects of monitoring and control. That
is, model monitoring and control variables separately, and use
these as predictors of H&B performance instead of a single error
detection construct. Overall, our goal here is to build on previous
work by extending theory and measurement surrounding error
detection as a predictor of individuals’ H&B task performance.
Figure 1B shows our proposed model. The following section will
describe the monitoring and control aspects, and their inclusion
as independent predictors of individuals’ H&B performance is a
novel approach in the literature.
Monitoring and Control
Monitoring processes accumulate evidence in favor of judgments
and actions during their construction (via Type 1 or Type 2
processes; Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 2012; Ratcliff and Starns, 2013).
Confidence refers to this feeling or experience of evidence.
For example, a clinician with excellent monitoring would be
very confident for correct diagnoses but not at all confident
for incorrect diagnoses. Confidence is known to be a stable
individual differences trait and a predictor of action initiation.
For example, Jackson et al. (2016a,b) had participants answer test
items, indicate answer confidence, and decide whether to submit
the answer for marking. Figure 2 shows an example item.
Individuals’ trait Confidence is computed as the average of
their confidence ratings for all test items. Jackson et al. (2016a,b)
found that individuals with higher trait Confidence consistently
submitted more answers for marking (correct and incorrect) than
individuals with lower Confidence.
Control processes determine the threshold point of confidence
at which an action that is being considered will be initiated
FIGURE 2 | Example item from the Number Series Test.
(Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008;
Ackerman, 2014; White et al., 2015)1. For example, a clinician
might treat a patient only once s/he is more than 90% confident
in the diagnosis (e.g., Pauker and Kassirer, 1980; Djulbegovic
et al., 2014). Jackson et al. (2016a,b) also assessed this by
computing the threshold of confidence at which individuals
would submit their answers (referred to in their work as the
Point Of Sufficient cerTainty, or POST). Controlling for their
confidence, individuals with a higher control threshold submitted
fewer answers (correct and incorrect) for marking. Setting a
high threshold, therefore, represents a risk-averse strategy, as the
decision maker has more time to process potential actions while
confidence is being accumulated. A higher threshold increases
the likelihood of detecting errors, but the cost is that it may also
1Some readers may link control threshold to the criterion of Signal Detection
Theory. However, there are aspects of Signal Detection Theory that do not integrate
with the theory and prior research on which this research is based. This includes,
but is not limited to, the distributional assumptions about signal variance imposed
by Signal Detection Theory. For more details, please see our previous work
(Jackson et al., 2016a,b) as well as other related papers (Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996;
Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; Ratcliff and Starns, 2013; Fetsch et al., 2014). For these
reasons, we will refrain from discussion of Signal Detection Theory.
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increase the number of missed opportunities to submit correct
answers, though it can never decrease that number (e.g., Koriat
and Goldsmith, 1996). Setting a lower threshold will decrease
(or maintain) the proportion of missed opportunities, but at
the cost of also decreasing the likelihood of detecting errors.
Including monitoring confidence and control thresholds in the
model provides a more detailed account of how we manage the
initiation of actions than the error detection theory proposed
earlier. Shown in Figure 3, we can conceive the process of
answering an H&B question as Type 1 and Type 2 processes
occurring over time. Type 1 heuristics quickly generate an
incorrect response, and, given the fluency with which this answer
is generated, monitoring confidence will quickly rise in support
of it. If this level of confidence reaches the control threshold, this
initial response will be given. If, however, this does not happen,
Type 2 processes will start to check the original response and,
possibly, generate the accurate response. This will likely cause
confidence in the initial response to decline, and confidence in the
Type 2 response to increase until it reaches the control threshold.
Note that this does not describe the general state of affairs.
Type 1 responses are not always incorrect or faster than Type 2
responses. This just tends to apply for typical H&B tasks. What
should generally apply, however, is that a response is chosen when
confidence reaches a threshold.
From this perspective, it is likely that an individual who tends
to be confident will often be confident enough in their initial and
incorrect response to give it without further consideration. The
same logic applies to an individual who tends to set a low control
threshold. However, an individual who tends to be less confident,
and/or hold a higher control criterion, will be more likely to
engage in Type 2 processing. Provided that they also possess and
utilize the necessary Type 2 cognitive abilities, individuals who
tend to experience low monitoring confidence and/or hold high
control thresholds will more probably reach the correct answer.
Thus, from an individual differences perspective, individuals with
relatively low monitoring confidence, a high control threshold,
and strong cognitive abilities (like Gf) should do best on H&B
tasks.
Although similar, the monitoring and control view differs
from the error detection perspective in an important way.
By the latter, the ability to detect errors should differ
between individuals. Such a skill should be evidenced by
monitoring confidence discriminating between good and bad
judgments/actions. However, the literature on these sorts of
monitoring skills has revealed that they tend to be unreliable
as individual differences variables (Stankov and Crawford, 1996;
Jackson and Kleitman, 2014; Stankov et al., 2014). That is while
people tend to discriminate between accurate or inaccurate
judgments, in general, individuals tend not to be better or
worse than each other at doing this. Such results speak against
the theory that individuals are better or worse than each
other at “detecting” errors, independent of intelligence, skills,
etc.
Individuals do differ consistently in their overall level
of monitoring confidence and control threshold, however.
Individuals vary in their overall average level of confidence
(Pallier et al., 2002; Kleitman and Stankov, 2007; Stankov et al.,
2014). Similarly, individuals tend to vary in the control threshold
they set within a given context (Jackson et al., 2016a,b). These
results suggest that people adopt different strategies for checking
errors of judgments. As described above, low-confidence-high-
threshold individuals would be more likely to check for errors
than high-confidence-low-threshold individuals, regardless of
errors being made or not. The low-confidence-high-threshold
combination should, therefore, lead to the highest performance
level on H&B tasks, which do elicit automatic errors.
We will examine one implication of this theoretical difference:
that monitoring confidence and, in particular, control thresholds
link a broader range of decision constructs than the ability
to detect error. For example, a wide class of Bias tasks are
gambling measures that assess risk and ambiguity preference.
These differ from tasks like the Cognitive Reflection Test as
the final score indicates a difference in preference rather than
performance. The notion of error detection cannot account
for how or why these sorts of tasks should relate to the
broader range of H&B tasks. Such gambling biases should
FIGURE 3 | Examples of how monitoring confidence accumulates toward a control threshold over time leading to a Type 1 or Type 2 response.
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relate, however, to control thresholds. As mentioned above,
individuals who set a higher threshold are adopting a more
risk-averse strategy than individuals setting lower thresholds.
This is because adopting a high control threshold means that
you will not make a decision until you are sufficiently certain
that the decision is a good one. For example, holding a threshold
of say 90–100% means that you must be very certain of a
decision before initiating it. Therefore, adopting a high control
threshold is conceptually similar to having a low preference
for risky, uncertain, or ambiguous outcomes. Adopting a low
threshold such as 30–40%, however, means that you are willing
to make a decision despite great uncertainty. This is akin to
having a high preference for risk, uncertainty, or ambiguity. As
such, control thresholds provide a theoretical basis for expecting
a negative correlation between individuals’ preference for risk
on gambling tasks and performance on H&B tasks. Thus, in
addition to employing typical H&B tasks, we will expand our
dependent variables to include measures assessing biases for
uncertain and ambiguous outcomes (Risky Gambles and Ellsberg
Paradox). Individuals holding higher control thresholds are
expected to select more certain options (meaning fewer uncertain
and ambiguous options) on the gambling tasks than individuals
with lower thresholds.
Aims and Hypotheses
To summarize, our goal is to investigate the combined predictive
relations of individuals’ fluid reasoning abilities (Gf), monitoring
confidence, and control thresholds with a range of H&B tasks. We
will be extending previous work in two ways. First, by modeling
the residual covariance among the H&B tasks to determine the
extent to which cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and
control thresholds account for common variance. The degree
to which the zero-order correlations among the H&B tasks are
reduced will indicate the degree to which their covariance can
be explained by cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and
control thresholds. Second, by independently accounting for
monitoring and control variables, as an extension of previous
theories proposing that the ability to detect errors differs between
individuals. We hypothesize that:
H1. (a) Individuals with higher Gf will perform better on
H&B tasks than those with lower Gf.
(b) Individuals with lower monitoring confidence will
perform better on H&B tasks than those with higher
monitoring confidence.
(c) Individuals with a higher control threshold will do
better on H&B tasks than individuals with a lower
threshold.
H2. Individuals with a higher threshold will select more
certain options in the gambling tasks than individuals
with a lower control threshold.
H3. After accounting for variance predicted by Gf,
monitoring confidence, and control thresholds, the
residual correlations among the H&B tasks will be
weaker than their zero-order correlations, and possibly
null.
These hypotheses will be tested via structural equation
modeling to account for shared covariance among the variables.
Before these final tests, however, inference will be made, where
possible, on the basis of the zero-order correlation matrix.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In return for partial course credit, 250 first year psychology
students at the University of Sydney participated in the study
(N = 250, 158 female, 92 male, Mage = 20.46 years, age range:
17.41–60.65 years). Participants completed all tests below within
a larger battery, which included measures of executive function2.
Measures
Fluid Cognitive Abilities (Gf) and Monitoring
Confidence
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (short version)
For each item, participants see a 3 × 3 matrix of abstract
figures following a pattern (Raven, 1938–1965). The bottom right
figure is blank, and participants chose which of eight alternatives
completes the pattern. Accuracy is a gold standard measure of
Gf. As shown in Figure 2, each item was accompanied by a
confidence rating and decision to submit the answer for marking
or not. Participants were instructed to try and maximize their
overall test score. To reduce the duration of the study and fatigue,
a subset of 12 of the standard 36 items were selected a priori for
administration in this study, on the basis of previous research
using Australian undergraduates (Jackson and Kleitman, 2014;
Jackson et al., 2016a,b). This selection is consistent with our
own and others psychometric analyses of previous data using
this cohort as these items have been found to be suitable for
assessing a unidimensional reasoning construct (Waschl et al.,
2016). For each participant, mean Accuracy and Confidence
scores are computed across all items.
Esoteric Analogies Test
For each item, participants must complete an analogy such
as “CONSTELLATION is to STAR as ARCHIPELAGO is
to: ISLAND (correct answer), PENINSULA, CONTINENT,
COUNTRY?” (Stankov, 1997). Accuracy depends on both
knowledge and Gf, as the participant needs to comprehend the
words and then apply the relationships. Confidence ratings and
the decision to submit answers for marking follow each item.
On the basis of previous research (Jackson and Kleitman, 2014;
Jackson et al., 2016a,b), 18 items were selected from the total 24.
For each participant, mean Accuracy and Confidence scores are
computed accross all items.
Number Series Test
For each item, participants type the number they think completes
a series such as 2 – 4 – 6 – 8 – ? (correct answer: 10). Participants
2In addition to the described tests, participants completed a range of executive
functioning measures (e.g., Stroop). However, the executive functioning measures
were not usable due to a technical fault in the recording of response times in a web
browser, thus we omit them from further reporting.
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are permitted to use a calculator to remove the influence of
numerical ability. Accuracy, therefore, depends on Gf, as the
participant needs to determine the rules underlying the series.
Twelve items are automatically generated as recommended by
Arendasy and Sommer (2012). All participants received items of
equivalent numbers of rules, numbers of operations, periodicity,
and complexity to each other. Confidence ratings and the
decision whether to submit answers for marking accompany each
item. For each participant, mean Accuracy and Confidence scores
are computed accross all items.
Control Thresholds
Medical Decision-Making Test
In this test, participants adopt the role of a specialist in the
Alpha virus (Jackson and Kleitman, 2014; Jackson et al., 2016a,b).
Participants are instructed that the Alpha virus can occur in a
regular form or one of three mutations (A1, A2, and A3). After
having 3 min to memorize how nine symptoms are associated
with each form, participants diagnose patients presenting with
two symptoms each. For time reasons, participants completed
a half-form version of this test with 16 rather than 33 patients.
A confidence rating and a decision to treat the patient or
request a blood test accompanies each diagnosis. Participants are
instructed to save as many lives as possible by treating correctly
diagnosed patients or blood test misdiagnosed patients. In this
research, this test was used to obtain a measure of individuals’
control threshold: the point of confidence at which individuals
were sufficiently certain in their diagnosis to treat a patient. The
threshold was calculated by regressing the decision (treat or blood
test) on paired confidence ratings in a logistic regression for each
participant (Jackson et al., 2016a for details).
Financial Decision-Making Test
This test followed a similar format to the Medical Decision-
Making Test, but in a financial setting, and was developed for
this experiment. In each item, participants choose a product in
which to invest. The goal is to select the product likely to yield the
greatest return. Each item presents a table of six products and five
features. Each feature carries an expected return. For example,
feature A might have a 30% chance of returning $2000 and a
70% chance of returning nothing. Each product has a different
feature combination. Two of the six products yield the greatest
expected return, with one being based on more risky features
than the other. A confidence rating and a decision to invest in
the chosen product or spend money on a research team to help
find the best product follow each product choice. In this research,
this test was used to obtain a second measure of individuals’
control thresholds: the point of confidence at which individuals
were sufficiently certain in their product choice to invest.
Heuristics and Biases
Cognitive Reflection Test
This test comprises of numerical problems such as the bat and
the ball problem described in the section “Introduction.” Here
we used an expanded 7-item version of this test (Toplak et al.,
2014) that includes Frederick’s (2005) three original items. The
longer test version was used to ensure satisfactory psychometric
properties (Toplak et al., 2014). Participants type their response
for each item. The final score is computed as the number of
questions out of seven answered correctly.
Applying Decision Rules
For each item in this test, participants must determine which
DVD player(s) meet the rules laid out by a potential consumer
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Each item includes five DVD
players that are rated from very low (1) to very high (5) on
four attributes (e.g., picture quality). The rules are selected to
elicit heuristics related to elimination by aspects, satisficing,
lexicographic, and equal weights rules (Payne et al., 1993). These
must be overcome to determine the correct answer deliberatively.
For example, “Lisa wants the DVD player with the highest average
rating across features,” elicits the equal weights rule. The test
includes 10 items of this type, and the final score is computed
as the number answered correctly.
Consistency in Risk Perception
This task assesses the ability to follow probability rules.
Participants rate the probability from 0% (no chance) to 100%
(certainty) that they will experience various events (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007). For example, “What is the probability that
you will die in a terrorist attack in the next year”? Participants
rate 10 events in two time frames (20 ratings all up): that the
events will occur in the next year and the next 5 years. Each
event pair is scored as correct if the probability assigned to the
next year version is no greater than the probability assigned to
the 5-year version. In each time frame, three items are nested
subsets of others. For example, dying in a terrorist attack is nested
within dying as a result of any cause. Each nested item receives
an additional point if it is assigned a probability no greater than
its relevant superset. Further, in each time frame, two items are
complementary to others. For example, getting in a car accident
is complementary to being accident free. Each of these items
receives an additional point if its assigned probability is equal to
100 minus probability assigned to the complementary. The final
score is a mark out of 20 possible points: 10 time-frame pairs, six
nested pairs, and four complementary pairs.
Resistance to Framing
This task assesses whether irrelevant features of the problem
description influence an individual’s value assessment.
Participants rate their preference for (1) definitely option A
to (6) definitely option B, in seven scenarios. Each scenario
presents a risky option and a sure-thing option (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007). For example, one item states that the U.S.
is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Participants must indicate their
preference for adopting program A, which will save 200 people
for sure, or program B, which has a 1/3 chance of saving all 600
people, and a 2/3 chance of saving none. Participants complete
all seven scenarios twice. At the beginning of the test battery,
scenarios are framed in terms of gains such as the example above
which frames outcomes in terms of people saved. At the end
of the test battery, the scenarios are presented with equivalent
options but framed in terms of losses. For example, the options
for the disease scenario above would be (A) 400 people die for
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sure, (b) 1/3 chance of 400 people dying, and 2/3 chance of 600
dying. The absolute difference between the sum of the ratings
for the positive and sum of the ratings for negative versions
evidences performance. For this variable, however, scores closer
to zero indicate better performance. Here, this value is reverse
scored by subtracting it from 42 (the max score if all ratings
were 6) so that higher scores indicate better Resistance to
Framing.
Resistance to Sunk Costs
This task assesses the ability to ignore prior, but now
inconsequential costs when making a decision. Participants read
10 scenarios that present a prior cost followed by one option
that ignores the cost (the normatively correct option) and one
that does not (the sunk cost option). They then rate whether
they would be more likely to continue with (1) the sunk cost
option or (6) the normatively correct option. For example, one
scenario states that you’ve just ordered a dessert with chocolate
and ice cream after eating a large meal. You have a few bites and
find that you are full and would rather not eat any more. The
participant rates whether they would be more likely to eat more
(sunk cost) or stop eating. The final score is the mean rating with
the highest score of six representing the best Resistance to Sunk
Costs.
Risky Gambles
This task assesses a preference for risky over certain alternatives
(Lauriola et al., 2007). Participants are instructed to adopt the role
of a manager deciding between buying and selling contracts. For
each item, participants select one of two contracts. One contract
offers a certain outcome such as a 100% chance of gaining
$10,000. The other offers a risky but normatively equivalent
outcome such as a 25% chance of gaining $40,000 and 75% chance
of gaining nothing. Participants decide upon 20 contracts. These
comprise of four expected outcomes of $1000 or $20,000 being
lost or gained, combined with five risky equivalents matched to 2,
25, 50, 75, and 98% of the expected value. The final score is the
number of risky alternatives out of 20 selected.
Ellsberg Paradox
This task assesses a preference for ambiguous (unknown
probabilities) over a known risk (Ellsberg, 1961; Lauriola et al.,
2007). Each item presents the participant with two urns each
containing 100 black and white balls in total. The distribution of
black and white balls is unknown in one urn (the ambiguous urn)
and known in the other. The participant must choose the urn they
believe would have the best chance of drawing a white ball on the
first draw. There are nine items, with the number of white balls in
the known risk urn incrementing from 10 to 90 out of 100. The
final score is the number of ambiguous urns out of nine selected.
Personality
Mini IPIP
This is a 50-item self-report measure of the Big-5 Personality
dimensions: Intellect, Conscientiousness, Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Emotional Stability (Donnellan et al., 2006).
Results for these personality dimensions are not reported here
because, consistent with much of our own previous research
(e.g., Kleitman, 2008; Jackson and Kleitman, 2014; Stankov
et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2016a,b), they did not show any
meaningful association with the on-task decision-making and
on-task metacognitive variables. Consistent with these results,
Burns et al. (2016) demonstrated that, in contrast to self-report
measures of confidence, on-task measures of confidence do not
meaningfully relate with self-report personality measures. Thus,
maintain our focus on the on-task measures, results for this
Personality scale will not be reported.
Procedure
Participants signed up to participate over the Internet and
received a URL to access these tests (within a larger battery)
and complete them online. A notification appeared before each
test reminding participants to take a short break. However, they
were required to progress through the entire protocol in a single
session. That is, they could have a short break after completing
each test, but not exit the Internet browser and return at a
later time or different place. Most participants completed the
entire battery within a single 2-h period. Participants received
partial course credit upon completion of the protocol but were
not otherwise incentivized. Although this is a potential concern,
previous research in our lab has revealed negligible differences
between online participation (as done here) and in-person lab
participation (Jackson, 2016).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Internal
consistency estimates were computed as Cronbach’s alpha
(Cronbach, 1951) for all variables except the control threshold.
For the control threshold, internal consistency was computed on
the basis of an Odd/Even item split correlation corrected using
the Spearman-Brown Formula (Stankov and Crawford, 1996;
Jackson et al., 2016a,b).
Descriptive statistics for all measures were typical for an
Australian undergraduate sample. Mean Accuracy in the Gf
tasks indicated a suitable level of difficulty (range = 57.30–
76.66%). Confidence levels for the Gf tasks (range = 65.84–
81.14%) and control thresholds from the other decision tasks
(52.85 and 44.20%) were also within a typical range comparing
to previous work on similar cohorts (Jackson et al., 2016a,b).
For these variables, internal consistency estimates were poor for
two variables: Accuracy in the Number Series Test (0.58), and
the control thresholds for the novel Financial Decision-Making
Test (0.56). The likely reason for this is that both of these tests
were relatively short and newly developed. However, internal
consistency estimates for the remaining variables above were
good (range= 0.68–0.94).
Mean scores for the performance-based H&B tasks were in
the typical range (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). However,
internal consistency estimates for two of the H&B tasks were
unacceptably low: Resistance to Sunk Costs task (0.39) and the
Ellsberg Paradox (0.43). These low estimates indicated that we
could not interpret the scores for these tasks in a meaningful
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for all variables.
Mean SD Min Max IC
Cognitive Abilities (Gf)
Advanced Progressive Matrices Accuracy (%) 57.30 20.75 8.33 100.00 0.68
Esoteric Analogies Test Accuracy (%) 62.20 18.71 16.67 100.00 0.74
Number Series Test Accuracy (%) 76.66 16.73 33.33 100.00 0.58
Monitoring Confidence
Advanced Progressive Matrices Confidence (%) 65.84 15.52 30.83 100.00 0.84
Esoteric Analogies Test Confidence (%) 67.04 18.98 0.00 100.00 0.94
Number Series Test Confidence (%) 81.14 14.53 33.33 100.00 0.84
Control Thresholds
Medical Decision-Making Test Threshold (%) 52.85 16.01 10.15 96.67 0.80
Financial Decision-Making Test Threshold (%) 44.20 15.79 0.31 92.64 0.56
Heuristics/biases
Cognitive Reflection Test (/7) 2.07 1.85 0.00 7.00 0.70
Applying Decision Rules (/10) 5.69 2.12 1.00 9.00 0.60
Consistency in Risk Perception (/20) 15.32 2.05 8.00 20.00 0.50
Resistance To Framing (/42) 37.64 4.14 19.00 42.00 0.61
Resistance to Sunk Costs (/6) 4.12 .66 2.10 6.00 0.39
Risky Gambles (/20) 8.95 3.22 0.00 17.00 0.63
Ellsberg Paradox (/9) 3.03 1.25 0.00 5.00 0.43
IC, internal consistency estimate.
fashion (Cronbach, 1951). We, therefore, removed these tasks
from further analyses. In line with previous research (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007; Del Missier et al., 2012; Weller et al., 2012),
internal consistency estimates for the remaining H&B tasks were
low but acceptable for research purposes (range= 0.50–0.70).
Table 2 shows the correlations between all retained variables.
The Gf Accuracy variables all correlated in a moderate fashion
with each other. Confidence scores from the cognitive ability
tests also correlated with each other and Accuracy scores. In
the line with recent work using the same tests (Jackson et al.,
2016a,b), Confidence and Accuracy scores from the same test
had somewhat higher correlations than those observed with
achievement tests in the past (Stankov et al., 2012). Following
this recent work, test-specific correlations were managed in the
forthcoming structural equation modeling by allowing residuals
of the Accuracy and Confidence variables from the same test to
correlate. The two control threshold scores correlated positively
with each other and weakly with the Accuracy and Confidence
variables.
In line with previous work (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005;
Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Del Missier et al., 2012), the
H&B tasks correlated with each other in a weak to moderate
fashion. Applying Decision Rules and the Cognitive Reflection
Test related most strongly to the other variables, with these tasks
correlating significantly with almost all other tasks. Consistent
with Hypothesis 1a, Gf Accuracy scores correlated, by-and-large,
positively with the H&B tasks. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b,
confidence scores also correlated positively and significantly with
some H&B tasks. Though, these were not as strong as the
correlations of the H&B tasks with the Accuracy scores, and some
of these correlations were negative (but weak). Although we had
not hypothesized these positive correlations, the strong positive
correlations of Confidence with Accuracy scores was likely the
reason for this. Hypothesis 1c, however, was not supported: The
control threshold variables did not correlate significantly with
the performance-based H&B tasks. It did, however, correlate
significantly and negatively with the number of risky alternatives
selected on the gambling task, consistent with Hypothesis 2. This
matrix was submitted to structural equation modeling to more
clearly investigate the hypotheses.
Structural Equation Modeling
A structural equation model was constructed in two steps to
investigate the hypotheses.
Step 1
The model specified in Step 1 reflects consistent modeling
decisions made in our previous work (Jackson et al., 2016b).
Gf, monitoring confidence and control threshold factors were
defined and allowed to covary freely. As intended, the Gf factor
was defined by Accuracy scores from the three cognitive tests
(APM, EAT, and NST). It was possible to compute monitoring
confidence and control thresholds for these and the other
tests (MDMT and FDMT). However, as statistically dependent
variables cannot be included in the same SEM, the monitoring
confidence factor was defined by confidence scores from the
cognitive tests (APM, EAT and NST), and the control threshold
factor on the basis of the MDMT and FDMT. Given the strong
method correlations, residuals between Accuracy and Confidence
variables from the same test were allowed to covary. Model fit
was good: χ214 = 28.87, p = 0.01, χ2/df = 2.06, CFI = 0.98,
TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.07 [0.03, 0.10], SRMR = 0.06. All
factor loadings and residual correlations among the test-specific
Accuracy and Confidence scores were strong and significant
(p < 0.001). In line with previous research (Stankov et al., 2014
for a review), there was a moderate/strong positive correlation
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TABLE 2 | Correlations between retained variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. APM Accuracy
2. EAT Accuracy 0.35∗
3. NST Accuracy 0.41∗ 0.35∗
4. APM Confidence 0.61∗ 0.21∗ 0.31∗
5. EAT Confidence 0.16∗ 0.56∗ 0.12 0.34∗
6. NST Confidence 0.30∗ 0.24∗ 0.72∗ 0.42∗ 0.29∗
7. MDMT Threshold 0.05 −0.13 −0.07 0.18∗ 0.10 0.06
8. FDMT Threshold 0.03 −0.21∗ −0.07 0.25∗ 0.04 0.04 0.40∗
9. Cognitive Reflection Test 0.49∗ 0.38∗ 0.43∗ 0.29∗ 0.23∗ 0.30∗ 0.01 0.15
10. Applying Decision Rules 0.34∗ 0.44∗ 0.45∗ 0.11 0.19∗ 0.24∗ −0.09 −0.05 0.43∗
11. Consistency in Risk Perception 0.16∗ 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.05 −0.06 −0.08 0.14∗ 0.22∗
12. Resistance to Framing 0.06 0.13∗ −0.10 −0.09 0.06 −0.18∗ −0.09 −0.02 0.01 0.13∗ 0.00
13. Risky Gambles −0.02 −0.04 −0.03 −0.09 −0.07 −0.03 −0.07 −0.18∗ −0.17∗ −0.04 0.05 0.06
∗p < 0.05.
APM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; EAT, Esoteric Analogists Test; NST, Number Series Test; MDMT, Medical Decision-Making Test; FDMT, Financial Decision-
Making Test.
between the Gf and Confidence factors (r = 0.62, p < 0.001),
a small/moderate positive correlation between the monitoring
confidence and control threshold factors (r= 0.31, p< 0.01), and
a weak, non-significant correlation between the Gf and control
threshold factors (r = −0.19, p = 0.07). The parameters of this
model were constrained for the next step. These results can be
seen as dashed lines in Figure 4, which shows the results of the
final model conducted in Step 2.
Step 2
After fixing parameters from the model in Step 1, the H&B tasks
were regressed on the Gf, Confidence, and control threshold
factors, and their residual correlations were allowed to covary
freely. This model fit the data well: χ253 = 76.31, p = 0.02,
χ2/df= 1.44, CFI= 0.97, TLI= 0.96, RMSEA= 0.04 [0.02, 0.06],
SRMR = 0.05. However, before discussing the results further, it
was notable that not one of the residual correlations between the
H&B tasks was significantly greater than zero. Thus, a final model
step was taken.
Step 3
This final step was done to determine whether the non-significant
residual correlations observed between the H&B tasks could be
considered equivalent to zero as a whole. As such, the model
described in Step 2 was further limited by constraining all of
these residual correlations to zero. The model fit was good
(χ263 = 86.44, p = 0.03, χ2/df = 1.37, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.97,
RMSEA= 0.04 [0.01, 0.06], SRMR= 0.06) and, importantly, this
constrained model did not differ significantly from the model
defined in Step 2 (χ210 = 10.13, p = 0.43). Thus, the results
demonstrated that all of the residual correlations among the
H&B tasks were statistically equivalent to zero. This provided
sound evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3: that the residual H&B
correlations would be weak and, in this case, null. That is, all
covariance among the H&B tasks could be explained by cognitive
abilities, monitoring, and control. Figure 4 shows the results for
this final model.
All H&B tasks were significantly predicted by one or more
of Gf, monitoring confidence, or the control thresholds. Notably
large proportions of variance were explained in the Cognitive
Reflection Test (R2 = 0.56) and Applying Decision Rules
(R2 = 0.44). Low proportions of variance were accounted for in
the Consistency in Risk Perception (R2 = 0.07), Resistance to
Framing (R2 = 0.05), and Risky Gambles (R2 = 0.07).
As hypothesized, individuals with higher Gf (Hypothesis 1a)
did better on the performance-based H&B tasks than individuals
with lower Gf. Specifically, individuals with higher Gf performed
significantly better on all performance-based H&B tasks (all
tasks except Risky Gambles). The positive prediction of Gf was
clearly stronger for the Cognitive Reflection Test and Applying
Decision Rules. These strong and positive predictions were most
likely because these tasks are known to require considerable
mental processing even after overcoming heuristic responses. The
Consistency in Risk Perception and Resistance to Framing tasks,
however, do not depend on such a high level of mental processing,
hence their lower relation with Gf.
Supporting Hypothesis 1b, lower confidence individuals also
performed better than higher confidence individuals on all of
these tasks, even after controlling for Gf and control thresholds.
This effect was significant for all tasks but the prediction of
Consistency in Risk Perception. Control threshold, however, were
the weakest overall predictor of H&B performance, supporting,
but only weakly, Hypothesis 1c. That is, relative to individuals
with a lower threshold, individuals with a higher control
threshold were performing significantly better on the Cognitive
Reflection Test. In support of Hypothesis 2, control thresholds
were also a significant negative predictor of preference for risky
gambles. That is, the higher an individual’s threshold, the fewer
risky alternatives they selected in the gambling task.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the research presented here was to investigate whether
cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and control thresholds
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FIGURE 4 | Results of the final structural equation model described in Step 2. Dashed lines represent fixed parameters whose values and significance levels
were determined in Step 1 of the model. ∗p < 0.05. APM, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices; EAT, Esoteric Analogists Test; NST, Number Series Test; MDMT,
Medical Decision-Making Test; FDMT, Financial Decision-Making Test.
could explain individual differences in Heuristics and Biases
(H&B; Hypotheses 1a, b, and c, respectively) and gambling tasks
(Hypothesis 2). We found that performance and preferences
(where relevant) in the H&B tasks used here were predicted
by fluid reasoning ability (Gf), monitoring confidence, and to
some degree by control thresholds. Using traditional correlational
analyses and structural equation modeling, consistent with
the theory outlined in the Introduction, individuals with
higher Gf, lower monitoring confidence and a higher control
threshold performed better on the H&B tasks than individuals
with lower Gf, higher confidence and a lower threshold.
Furthermore, supporting a broader theoretical application,
in the Risky Gambles task, individuals who held a lower
control threshold also showed a greater bias for selecting
risky rather than certain alternatives. Altogether, this research
was the first to investigate and demonstrate that differences
in cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and control
thresholds relate closely to the way individuals respond to H&B
tasks.
A further novel aspect of our results was the finding
that cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and control
thresholds explained all of the common variability in the
H&B tasks (Hypothesis 3). This result was indicated by null
residual correlations between the H&B tasks after they had
been regressed on Gf, monitoring confidence, and control
threshold factors in a structural equation model. This result
was further strengthen by the finding that constraining all of
these correlations to zero had no significant effect on the model
fit. Thus, after accounting for cognitive abilities, monitoring
confidence, and control thresholds, only task-specific factors
were driving individual differences on these tasks. These results
therefore align with much work describing decision-making as
the construction and initiation of actions by cognitive abilities,
monitoring, and control (e.g., Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996;
Ratcliff and Starns, 2013; Ackerman, 2014; White et al., 2015;
Jackson et al., 2016a,b). Still, these results should be considered
preliminary, and we hope that future studies will build upon
these findings by expanding the selection of H&B tasks to confirm
them.
Explaining Error Detection
Nonetheless, the results align with a theoretical stance that
extends existing explanations of individuals’ H&B task
performance in an important way. Existing explanations
propose the involvement of error detection ability (e.g.,
Stanovich and West, 2008). Here, we proposed that error
detection involves monitoring and control processes. Including
monitoring confidence and control thresholds into the model
suggests that, accounting for intellectual capacities and skills,
individuals adopt a particular decision-making strategy that
indirectly results in them being more or less likely to detect
errors. The importance of this becomes evident considering tasks
outside of the H&B literature. By existing theories, individuals
should make better or worse decisions in general (e.g., Fischhoff,
2010), as they are capable of detecting whether they are going
to make an error. Thus, an individual who performs well on
H&B tasks will perform well in other contexts. Extending this to
include monitoring confidence and control thresholds suggests
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that individuals will make better or worse decisions depending
on the context. For example, H&B tasks deliberately elicit the
use of heuristics that lead to an incorrect response. Individuals
do best on these tasks if they hold low confidence and a high
threshold because it gives them time to engage Type 2 processes.
However, it is possible to develop highly effective heuristics in
other contexts like firefighting (Kahneman and Klein, 2009).
In such contexts, the performance of individuals with low
confidence and a high threshold will suffer because they will
be wasting unnecessary time. The present results, therefore,
contribute to the mounting evidence that individuals do not
detect errors due to some ability. Rather, individuals who detect
more errors have likely adopted a slower, risk-averse strategy,
making them best suited for contexts like those faced in H&B
tasks.
Control Unknowns
The one major unknown for this perspective surrounds
individual differences in control processes. Compared to
cognitive abilities and monitoring confidence, little individual
differences research has been conducted on control thresholds. It
is possible, for example, that the capacity to set one’s threshold
at an optimal point depending on the environment differs
between individuals. There is some evidence that this is possible.
For example, individuals’ are known to adjust their thresholds
differently across contexts (Aminoff et al., 2012; Jackson et al.,
2016b). Furthermore, the ability to discriminate accurate from
inaccurate judgments via binary decisions differs reliably between
individuals (Jackson and Kleitman, 2014; Jackson et al., 2016a,b).
Given that monitoring discrimination does not differ between
individuals (Stankov and Crawford, 1996; Jackson and Kleitman,
2014), it is possible that differences in thresholds are the cause
of this. Overall, control processes are clearly more flexible than
monitoring processes. Indeed, it is likely that the relatively
weak contribution of control thresholds observed in this study
was a result of these domain-specific attributes. It is possible,
therefore, that the ability to optimize one’s threshold for a
decision task differs among individuals. This notion differs
from the traditional concept of error “detection” (which relates
more to monitoring) but provides an alternative means by
which certain individuals could be better decision makers than
others.
Personality
Replicating previous results, personality variables shared no
meaningful relationships with any of the variables under
investigations, and were, therefore, omitted from any discussions
in this manuscript. We recommend that if timing is an issue
and on-task measures of decision-making and confidence are
employed, future studies omit personality measures from their
research protocol.
Implications
Additional to these theoretical considerations, considering
decision-making in terms of cognitive abilities, monitoring
confidence, and control thresholds carries important applied
implications. Consider, for example, that individuals of
comparable cognitive abilities might be better or worse decision
makers depending on the context. Organizations should,
therefore, select individuals for very specific decision-making
tasks based on their monitoring confidence and control
thresholds. Further implications for decision training exist.
Certain training programs have adopted H&B tasks as a
benchmark for competent decision-making (e.g., Jacobson et al.,
2012). Given the results here, it is possible that such training
might be encouraging individuals to adopt a particular decision
strategy that will only suit a narrow range of contexts. Using
H&B tasks for selection or a benchmark of training efficacy
should, therefore, be conducted with caution. Good performance
on H&B tasks might indicate poorer decision-making in other
contexts.
The topic of training is particularly interesting for these
reasons. On one hand, the notion of having to train people for
particular decision environments is alarming, as it complicates
and limits the efficacy of training programs. On the other hand,
the possibility that individuals are capable of optimizing their
control thresholds opens new avenues. Cognitive processes are
notoriously resistant to intervention (Harrison et al., 2013).
Monitoring has proven to be slightly more amenable to change
(de Bruin and van Gog, 2012; Kleitman and Costa, 2014). Control
thresholds are already known to be more flexible and set by
our perceptions of payoffs (e.g., Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996;
Aminoff et al., 2012; Ackerman, 2014; Jackson et al., 2016b).
It is thus likely to be a prime target for intervention. For this
reason, we see the potential for training decision control to
adapt optimally to different environments as a novel and exciting
prospect.
Limitations
Our results and these implications are not without their
limitations, however. As mentioned, we did not explicitly test the
error detection ability versus strategy hypothesis. Our findings
do contribute to accumulating evidence in favor of the strategy
perspective, but these contrasting hypotheses will need to be
examined concurrently to make firm conclusions. Should such
work be undertaken, we’d advise that researchers take care to
dissociate the constructs of importance. For example, thinking-
style measures tapping individuals’ tendency to think rationally
is often seen as valuable, but this tendency could simply be
a product of high control thresholds. It will be useful in
future research to concurrently capture a range of constructs
related to error detection and compare how they relate to
tasks that are representative and non-representative of the
environment.
Another general limitation of our results is the use of a student
population. On one hand, this has been a consistent element of
our previous research (Jackson et al., 2016a,b). We have thus
been able to formulate robust expectations about undergraduate
students and feel confident that we are tapping into reliable
constructs. Still, students differ from the general population on
some important attributes that will require investigation. For
example, Type 1 knowledge structures and heuristics tend to be
acquired over time via extensive learning (Stanovich et al., 2008;
Weller et al., 2012). Older populations might, therefore, generate
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Type 1 responses more frequently and with greater confidence
than younger populations. Similarly, university students might
generate Type 1 answers more frequently and confidently
than young children. It is also important to bear in mind
that university students differ from the general population on
attributes like cognitive abilities, and our sample were not
incentivized to complete the tasks appropriately. Thus, although
replicable within a university population, researchers will need
to examine the results found here in other age groups or for
individuals with different cognitive abilities.
Focal to the results at hand, the domain specificity of the
control threshold might be a cause for its relatively weak
contribution compared to cognitive abilities and monitoring
confidence. Strong domain specificity in control thresholds
has been shown to exist (Jackson et al., 2016b). The tests
used to derive control thresholds imposed some loss for
decision errors. For example, incorrect treatment of a patient
in the MDMT results in patient death. There are no penalties,
however, for incorrect answers on the H&B tasks. It is thus
possible that individuals’ control thresholds in the H&B tasks
differed from their thresholds in the other tasks, making
the total contribution of control thresholds relatively weak.
We suspect that capturing control thresholds in tasks with
similar outcomes to the H&B tasks will yield stronger
results.
Finally, although we endeavored to collect a broad range of
H&B tasks, we were of course limited from a logistical point
of view. Our selection of tests did not represent a great many
H&B tasks. It will likely be important to test our hypotheses
using a different range of H&B tasks. To add to this, we
would also recommend that researchers consider the role of
cognitive abilities, monitoring confidence, and control thresholds
in other decision tasks. Our position is that these three constructs
are involved quite generally in the decision-making process.
Over 170 tasks are listed in the Decision-Making Individual
Differences Inventory (Appelt et al., 2011). It will be important
to discern which of these are valid, general and useful for
studying decision-making and applying the research findings.
We suspect that measures of cognitive abilities, monitoring
confidence and control thresholds will yield strong results in such
investigations.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the results here indicated that individuals’ performance
on a range of H&B tasks could be predicted, at times substantially,
by the strength of their cognitive abilities (Gf) and their levels of
monitoring output (Confidence) and decision control threshold.
Furthermore, these constructs explained almost all of the shared
covariance among the H&B tasks. The results contribute to the
growing concept that cognitive abilities, monitoring, and control
are crucial and general psychological mechanisms involved in
decision behavior. This concept leads to an important prospect:
that after their cognitive capacities, individuals might not possess
varied decision skills, but rather adopt varied strategies suited
to different contexts. This prospect has important theoretical
and applied implications given that H&B tasks are often used
to measure benchmark decision performance, but might not
indicate universally better decision competence. This skill versus
strategy question remains an empirical question. However, it will
be an important one to answer for the useful progression of
the theory and applied uses of decision sciences. This research
adds to previous work finding that cognitive abilities, monitoring
confidence, and control thresholds are among the strongest
predictors of individual differences in decision-making.
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